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A NOTE ON NON-CLASSICAL NONSTANDARD ARITHMETIC
SAM SANDERS
Abstract. Recently, a number of formal systems for Nonstandard Analysis
restricted to the language of finite types, i.e. nonstandard arithmetic, have been
proposed. We single out one particular system by Dinis-Gaspar, which is cat-
egorised by the authors as being part of intuitionistic nonstandard arithmetic.
Their system is indeed inconsistent with the Transfer axiom of Nonstandard
Analysis, and the latter axiom is classical in nature as it implies (higher-order)
comprehension. Inspired by this observation, the main aim of this paper is to
provide answers to the following questions:
(Q1) In the spirit of Reverse Mathematics, what is the minimal fragment of
Transfer that is inconsistent with the Dinis-Gaspar system?
(Q2) What other axioms are inconsistent with the Dinis-Gaspar system?
Our answer to the first question suggests that the aforementioned inconsis-
tency actually derives from the axiom of extensionality relative to the standard
world, and that other (much stronger) consequences of Transfer are actually
harmless. Perhaps surprisingly, our answer to the second question shows that
the Dinis-Gaspar system is inconsistent with a number of (non-classical) conti-
nuity theorems which one would -in our opinion- categorise as intuitionistic in
the sense of Brouwer. Finally, we show that the Dinis-Gaspar system involves
a standard part map, suggesting this system also pushes the boundary of what
still counts as ‘Nonstandard Analysis’ or ‘internal set theory’.
1. Introduction
1.1. Aim and motivation. In the last decade, a number of versions of Heyting
and Peano arithmetic in all finite types have been introduced ([2,5,9,10]) which are
based on (fragments of) Nelson’s internal set theory ([18]). Such systems allow for
the extraction of the (copious) computational content of Nonstandard Analysis, as
discussed at length in [22]. In this paper, we study the system DG by Dinis-Gaspar
to be found in [5] and Section 2; DG has been described as follows:
We present a bounded modified realisability and a bounded func-
tional interpretation of intuitionistic nonstandard arithmetic with
nonstandard principles. ([5, Abstract], emphasis added)
Similar claims may be found in the body of [5]: DG is part of intuitionistic mathe-
matics, as claimed by the authors. This claim is not without merit: DG is indeed
inconsistent with the Transfer axiom of Nonstandard Analysis, and this axiom
is essentially the nonstandard version of comprehension. By way of an example,
Transfer restricted to Π01-formulas translates to the ‘Turing jump functional’ ∃
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as defined in Section 3.1.2. However, ‘non-classical’ does not necessarily imply
‘intuitionistic’, and we shall study the following two questions in this paper.
(Q1) In the spirit of Reverse Mathematics, what is the minimal fragment of
Transfer that is inconsistent with DG?
(Q2) What other (intuitionistic) axioms are inconsistent with DG?
The main results of this paper constitute answers to the questions (Q1) and (Q2),
and we now discuss them in some more detail.
Regarding (Q1), we refer to [24–26] for an introduction and overview of Reverse
Mathematics (RM for short). We shall consider the parameter-free Transfer princi-
ple studied in [3], and related axioms. We will identify the axiom of extensionality
(relative to the standard world) as the real culprit: this axiom follows from Transfer
and is inconsistent with DG, while other axioms implied by Transfer, even involving
the Turing jump functional, are consistent with DG.
Regarding (Q2), we show that DG is inconsistent with a number of (non-classical)
axioms which one would categorise as intuitionistic, i.e. part of Brouwer’s intuition-
istic mathematics1. The most blatant example is the statement that, relative to
the standard world, all functionals on the Cantor space are (uniformly) continuous.
In the course of investigating (Q1) and (Q2), one eventually stumbles upon
the fact that the Dinis-Gaspar system allows one to define a (highly elementary)
standard part map, as discussed in Section 3.3. Since such a map is not available in
Nelson’s internal set theory, and external in Robinson’s approach, the Dinis-Gaspar
system thus pushes the boundary of what still counts as ‘Nonstandard Analysis’.
As to the structure of this paper, we briefly discuss the importance of continuity
in intuitionism in Remark 1.1. The formal system DG from [5] and associated
prerequisites are sketched in Section 2. Our main results may be found in Section 3,
which provide fairly definitive answers to questions (Q1) and (Q2). We formulate
the conclusion to this paper in Section 4.
Next, we point out the (intimate) relationship between Brouwer ’s intuitionistic
mathematics and continuity, lest the reader believe the above is merely pedantry.
Remark 1.1 (Intuitionism and continuity). L.E.J. Brouwer is the founder of in-
tuitionism, a philosophy of mathematics which later developed into the first full-
fledged school of constructive mathematics. The latter is an umbrella term for
approaches to mathematics in which ‘there exists x’ is systematically interpreted
as ‘we can compute/construct x’ (and similarly for the other logical symbols).
Under this new interpretation of the logical symbols, certain laws do not make
any sense, and are therefore rejected; the most (in)famous one being the law of
excluded middle P ∨ ¬P . The resulting logic is intuitionistic logic, and we refer to
[1, 28] for an introduction to the various approaches to constructive mathematics.
Brouwer proved in 1927 (see [11, p. 444] for an English translation) that every
total (in the intuitionistic sense) function on the unit interval is (uniformly) con-
tinuous, a result which seems to contradict classical mathematics. The core axioms
for intuitionistic mathematics indeed include a ‘continuity’ axiom (called WC-N in
[28] and BP0 in [1]) which contradicts classical mathematics, and can be used to
prove the aforementioned (uniform) continuity theorem by Brouwer.
1Since ‘intuitionism’ is the first keyword of [5], we take ‘intuitionistic’ to mean ‘part of
Brouwer’s intuitionistic mathematics’. We discuss this choice in more detail in Remark 2.8.
A NOTE ON NON-CLASSICAL NONSTANDARD ARITHMETIC 3
The previous is well-known, but is mentioned since we want to stress the follow-
ing: a very low bar a logical system has to clear to deserve the moniker ‘intuition-
istic’, is to be consistent with the aforementioned continuity theorem and axiom.
As it turns out, this does not seem to be the case for the Dinis-Gaspar system.
Finally, despite (or perhaps better: ‘because’) the above criticism, we do be-
lieve that DG has some has some interesting features. For instance, DG is a sort
of non-classical analogue of the Fernand-Oliva bounded functional interpretation
(BFI hereafter; see [7]). Now, the BFI refutes extensionality, so results such as
Theorem 3.8 and its corollaries are, in this light, rather natural. Regarding BFI
and related matters, [8, Section 3] is also highly informative.
2. Preliminaries
We introduce the Dinis-Gaspar system DG, and some preliminaries.
2.1. Internal set theory and its fragments. In this section, we discuss Nelson’s
internal set theory, first introduced in [18], and the Dinis-Gaspar system DG from
[5]. The system DG is an extension of a fragment of Nelson’s system with (non-
classical) axioms pertaining to majorizability.
In Nelson’s syntactic approach to Nonstandard Analysis ([18]), as opposed to
Robinson’s semantic one ([21]), a new predicate ‘st(x)’, read as ‘x is standard’ is
added to the language of ZFC, the usual foundation of mathematics. The notations
(∀stx) and (∃sty) are short for (∀x)(st(x)→ . . . ) and (∃y)(st(y)∧ . . . ). A formula is
called internal if it does not involve ‘st’, and external otherwise. The three external
axioms schemes Idealisation, Standard Part, and Transfer govern the new predicate
‘st’; they are respectively defined2 as:
(I) (∀st finx)(∃y)(∀z ∈ x)ϕ(z, y)→ (∃y)(∀stx)ϕ(x, y), for internal ϕ.
(S) (∀x)(∃sty)(∀stz)
(
[z ∈ x ∧ ϕ(z)]↔ z ∈ y
)
, for any ϕ.
(T) (∀stx)ϕ(x, t) → (∀x)ϕ(x, t), where ϕ is internal, t captures all parameters
of ϕ, and t is standard.
The system IST is (the internal system) ZFC extended with the aforementioned
three external axioms; the former is a conservative extension of ZFC for the internal
language, as proved in [18].
In [2,5,9,10], the authors study Go¨del’s system T extended with versions of the
external axioms of IST. In particular, they consider nonstandard extensions of the
(internal) systems E-HAω and E-PAω, respectively Heyting and Peano arithmetic in
all finite types and the axiom of extensionality. We refer to [2, §2.1] for the exact
details of these (mainstream in mathematical logic) systems.
The results in [5, 9] are inspired by those in [2]. In particular, the notion of
finiteness central to the latter is replaced by the notion of strong majorizability. The
latter notion and the associated system DG is introduced in the next paragraph,
assuming familiarity with the higher-type framework of Go¨del’s T.
The system DG, a conservative extension of E-HAω, is based on the Howard-
Bezem notion of strong majorizability. We first introduce the latter and related
notions. For a more extensive background on strong majorizability, see [17, §3.5].
2The superscript ‘fin’ in (I) means that x is finite, i.e. its number of elements are bounded by
a natural number.
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Definition 2.1 (Majorizability). The strong majorizability predicate ‘≤∗’ is in-
ductively defined as follows:
• x ≤∗0 y is x ≤0 y;
• x ≤∗ρ→σ y is (∀u)(∀v ≤
∗
ρ u)
(
xu ≤∗σ yv ∧ yu ≤
∗
σ yv
)
.
An object xρ is called monotone if x ≤∗ρ x. The quantifiers (∀˜x
ρ) and (∃˜yρ) range
over the monotone objects of type ρ, i.e. they are abbreviations for the formulas
(∀x)(x ≤∗ x→ . . . ) and (∃y)(y ≤∗ y ∧ . . . ).
The system DG is defined as follows in [5, §2]. The language of E-HAωst is the
language of E-HAω extended with a new ‘standardness’ predicate stσ for every finite
type σ. The typing of the standardness predicate is usually omitted.
Definition 2.2 (Standard quantifiers). We write (∀stxτ )Φ(xτ ) and (∃stxσ)Ψ(xσ)
as short for (∀xτ )
[
st(xτ ) → Φ(xτ )
]
and (∃stxσ)
[
st(xσ) ∧ Ψ(xσ)
]
. A formula A is
‘internal’ if it does not involve st, and external otherwise. The formula Ast is defined
from A by appending ‘st’ to all quantifiers (except bounded number quantifiers).
Regarding the previous definition, we often say that ‘the formula Ast is the
formula A relative to the standard world’.
Definition 2.3. [Basic axioms] The system E-HAωst is defined as E-HA
ω+T ∗st+ IA
st,
where T ∗st consists of the following axiom schemas.
(a) x =σ y → (st
σ(x)→ stσ(y));
(b) stσ(y)→ (x ≤∗σ y → st
σ(x));
(c) stσ(t), for each closed term t of type σ;
(d) stσ→τ (z)→ (stσ(x)→ stτ (zx)).
Items (a)-(d) are called the standardness axioms, and (b) is singled out regularly
below. The external induction axiom IAst is the following schema for any Φ:
Φ(0) ∧ (∀stn0)(Φ(n)→ Φ(n+ 1))→ (∀stn0)Φ(n). (IAst)
The system DG is then defined as E-HAωst plus the following non-basic axioms.
Definition 2.4. [Non-basic axioms]
• Monotone Choice mACω: For any Φ, we have
(∀˜stx)(∃˜sty)Φ(x, y)→ (∃˜stf)(∀˜stx)(∃y ≤∗ f(x))Φ(x, y).
• Realization Rω: For any Φ, we have
(∀x)(∃sty)Φ(x, y)→ (∃˜stz)(∀x)(∃y ≤∗ z)Φ(x, y).
• Idealisation Iω: For any internal φ, we have:
(∀˜stz)(∃x)(∀y ≤∗ z)φ(x, y)→ (∃x)(∀sty)φ(x, y)
• Independence of premises IPω
∀˜st
: For any internal φ and any Ψ:
[(∀˜stx)φ(x) → (∃˜sty)Ψ(y)]→ (∃˜stz)[(∀˜stx)φ(x) → (∃˜y ≤∗ z)Ψ(y)]
• Nonstandard Markov’s principle Mω: For any internal φ, ψ, we have
[(∀˜stx)φ(x) → ψ]→ (∃˜sty)[(∀x ≤∗ y)φ(x)→ ψ]
• Majorizability axiom MAJω: (∀stx)(∃sty)(x ≤∗ y)
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Other axioms are mentioned in [5, §4], but these are derivable in DG. The
variables are not specified for Iω in [5], and we have chosen the version from IST.
We have also added ‘nonstandard’ to the description of the axiomMω to distinguish
it from the semi-constructive axiom MP, known as ‘Markov’s principle’, as follows:
(∀f1)
[
¬¬
[
(∃n)f(n) = 0
]
→ (∃n)f(n) = 0
]
. (MP)
Now, Mω implies MP with all quantifiers relative to ‘st’, which explains the name.
2.2. Notations in DG. In this section, we introduce notations relating to DG.
First of all, we will use the usual notations for rational and real numbers and
functions as introduced in [16, p. 288-289] (and [25, I.8.1] for the former).
Definition 2.5 (Real numbers and related notions in RCAω0 ).
• Natural numbers correspond to type zero objects, and we use ‘n0’ and
‘n ∈ N’ interchangeably. Rational numbers are defined as signed quotients
of natural numbers, and ‘q ∈ Q’ and ‘<Q’ have their usual meaning.
• Real numbers are coded by fast-converging Cauchy sequences q(·) : N → Q,
i.e. such that (∀n0, i0)(|qn − qn+i)| <Q
1
2n ). We use Kohlenbach’s ‘hat
function’ from [16, p. 289] to guarantee that every f1 defines a real number.
• We write ‘x ∈ R’ to express that x1 := (q1(·)) represents a real as in the
previous item and write [x](k) := qk for the k-th approximation of x.
• Two reals x, y represented by q(·) and r(·) are equal, denoted x =R y, if
(∀n0)(|qn − rn| ≤
1
2n−1 ). The inequality ‘<R’ is defined similarly.
• Functions F : R → R mapping reals to reals are represented by Φ1→1
mapping equal reals to equal reals, i.e. (∀x, y)(x =R y → Φ(x) =R Φ(y)).
• Sets of type ρ objects Xρ→0, Y ρ→0, . . . are given by their characteristic
functions fρ→0X , i.e. (∀x
ρ)[x ∈ X ↔ fX(x) =0 1], where f
ρ→0
X ≤ρ→0 1.
Secondly, we use the usual extensional notion of equality.
Remark 2.6 (Equality). The system DG includes equality between natural num-
bers ‘=0’ as a primitive. Equality ‘=τ ’ for type τ -objects x, y is then defined as:
[x =τ y] ≡ (∀z
τ1
1 . . . z
τk
k )[xz1 . . . zk =0 yz1 . . . zk] (2.1)
if the type τ is composed as τ ≡ (τ1 → . . .→ τk → 0). The inequality ‘≤τ ’ is just
(2.1) with ‘≤0’, i.e. binary sequences are given by f ≤1 1, which we also denote as
‘f ∈ C’ or ‘f ∈ 2N’. We define ‘approximate equality ≈τ ’ as follows:
[x ≈τ y] ≡ (∀
stzτ11 . . . z
τk
k )[xz1 . . . zk =0 yz1 . . . zk] (2.2)
with the type τ as above. The system DG includes the axiom of extensionality:
(∀ϕρ→τ )(∀xρ, yρ)
[
x =ρ y → ϕ(x) =τ ϕ(y)
]
. (Eρ→τ )
for all finite types. We write (E) for the collection of all axioms (Eρ→τ ).
Finally, we introduce some notation to handle finite sequences nicely.
Notation 2.7 (Finite sequences). We assume the usual coding of finite sequences
of objects of the same type. We denote by ‘|s| = n’ the length of the finite sequence
s = 〈sρ0, s
ρ
1, . . . , s
ρ
n−1〉, where |〈〉| = 0, i.e. the empty sequence has length zero. For
sequences s, t of the same type, we denote by ‘s ∗ t’ the concatenation of s and t,
i.e. (s ∗ t)(i) = s(i) for i < |s| and (s ∗ t)(j) = t(|s| − j) for |s| ≤ j < |s|+ |t|. For
a finite sequence s, we define sN := 〈s(0), s(1), . . . , s(N − 1)〉 for N0 < |s|. For a
sequence α0→ρ, we also write αN = 〈α(0), α(1), . . . , α(N − 1)〉 for any N0.
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Finally, we discuss our use of the term ‘intuitionistic’.
Remark 2.8. As already pointed out in Footnote 1, we interpret ‘intuitionistic’ to
mean ‘part of Brouwer’s intuitionistic mathematics’, due to the first keyword of [5]
being ‘intuitionism’. This term also has a more loose interpretation, not uncommon
in functional interpretations, meaning that the system is based on intuitionistic
logic, i.e. does not include all of classical logic. These kind of systems are sometimes
more correctly called semi-intuitionistic. Due to the topic of [5], the authors seem
to have had the second meaning in mind. Nonetheless, our results below show that
both senses of the term ‘intuitionistic’ are not completely compatible with DG, i.e.
there is good reason to claim that DG is ‘merely’ non-classical.
I thank the referee for pointing out the content of the previous remark.
3. Main results
Our main results fall into three main categories, as follows.
(i) In answer to (Q1), we show in Section 3.1 that DG is inconsistent with
certain (very) weak fragments of Transfer, but (oddly) not with others.
(ii) In answer to (Q2), we show in Section 3.2 that DG is inconsistent with
certain intuitionistic axioms, relative to the standard world; we also show
that DG does prove weak Ko¨nig’s lemma, relative to the standard world.
(iii) Inspired by these answers to (Q1) and (Q2), we show in Section 3.3 that
DG involves a highly elementary standard part map.
In light of the first two items, it seems that DG is not really a system of intuitionistic
arithmetic (but non-classical nonetheless), while the third item shows that DG
already pushes the boundary of what still counts as ‘Nonstandard Analysis’.
3.1. Non-classical aspects of the Dinis-Gaspar system. We provide a partial
answer to question (Q1) from Section 1.1 by showing that DG is inconsistent with
various weak fragments of Transfer, including parameter-free Transfer from [3], and
the Turing jump functional ∃2 from e.g. [16], relative to the standard world.
3.1.1. Parameter-free Transfer. We show that various extensions of DG, also involv-
ing intuitionistic axioms, are inconsistent with parameter-free Transfer as follows.
Principle 3.1 (PF-TP∃). For internal ϕ(x) with all free variables shown, we have
(∃x)ϕ(x)→ (∃stx)ϕ(x). (3.1)
To be absolutely clear, (standard) parameters are not allowed in ϕ(x) as in (3.1).
In contrast to richer fragments of Transfer, PF-TP∃ is weak: when added to
(fragments of) the classical system from [2], one obtains a conservative extension,
by [3, §3.2]. The results in [3,23] establish that PF-TP∃ yields a smooth development
of the (classical) Reverse Mathematics of Nonstandard Analysis.
We point out that certain fragments of the axiom of choice (including QF-AC2,0
as in the next theorem) are widely accepted in constructive and intuitionistic math-
ematics (see e.g. [1]). We also recall Markov’s principle MP introduced after Defi-
nition 2.4 and note that MP is rejected in intuitionistic mathematics ([28, p. 237]).
Theorem 3.2. The system DG+ PF-TP∃ + QF-AC
2,0 +MP is inconsistent.
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Proof. Recall that DG includes the axiom of extensionality (E2), which implies
(∀Y 2, f1, g1)(∃N0)[fN = gN → Y (f) = Y (g)],
by Markov’s principle MP. Applying QF-AC2,0, we obtain Φ2→00 such that
(∀Y 2, f1, g1)(∃N0 ≤ Φ0(Y, f, g))[fN = gN → Y (f) = Y (g)].
Applying PF-TP∃, there is standard such Φ0, yielding that
(∀stY 2, f1, g1)[f ≈1 g → Y (f) = Y (g)], (3.2)
since Φ0(Y, f, g) is standard for standard inputs. Note that (3.2) is (E2)
st, i.e. the
axiom of ‘standard extensionality’. Now consider the functional Y 20 defined as:
Y0(f) :=
{
0 (∃n ≤ N + 1)(f(n) = 0)
1 otherwise
, (3.3)
where N0 is nonstandard. Since Y 20 ≤
∗
2 1, and the constant-one-mapping of type
two is standard, Y0 is also standard by item (b) in the standardness axioms. Hence,
Y0 satisfies (3.2) and now consider f0 := 11 . . . and g0 := f0N ∗ 00 . . . , which
satisfy f0 ≈1 g0 and Y (f0) = 0 6= 1 = Y (g0). Note that g0 is standard by the
aforementioned item (b), as g0 ≤
∗
1 1 and the constant-one-mapping of type one is
standard, i.e. (3.2) yields a contradiction. 
Next, we show that the previous proof also goes through using a fragment of
Markov’s principle MP, called weak Markov’s principle (WMP for short; see [12]).
Most importantly for us, WMP is accepted in intuitionistic mathematics (but not
in Bishop’s constructive mathematics by the results in [14]). We will actually use
the following3 version of WMP, defined in [13]:
(∀Y 2, f1, g1)(Y (f) 6=0 Y (g)→ f 6=1 g). (SE)
Since ‘x 6= y’ is generally a stronger statement than ‘¬(x = y)’ in constructive
mathematics, SE is said to express strong extensionality.
Corollary 3.3. The system DG+ PF-TP∃ + QF-AC
2,0 + SE is inconsistent.
Proof. Note that SE implies the following by considering the least such N :
(∀Y 2, f1, g1)(∃N0)(Y (f) 6=0 Y (g)→ fN 6=0 gN)
As for the theorem, one derives (E2)
st and Y0 yields a contradiction. 
The inconsistency in the theorem also pops up when combining PF-TP∃ with
intuitionistic axioms, like the intuitionistic fan functional ([16, 27]) as follows.
(∃Ω3)(∀Y 2)(∀f, g ≤1 1)(fΩ(Y ) = gΩ(Y )→ Y (f) = Y (g)) (MUC)
Corollary 3.4. The system DG+ PF-TP∃ +MUC is inconsistent.
Proof. Since MUC is a sentence, PF-TP∃ guarantees the existence of a standard Ω
3
as in the former. Now consider Y0, f0, g0 from the proof of the theorem and note
that Ω(Y0) is a standard number. Hence, since f0 ≈1 g0 by definition, we have
0 = Y (f0) = Y (g0) = 1, a contradiction. 
3Note that SE is actually weaker than WMP, but SE ↔ WMP by [13, Thm. 11] in Bishop’s
constructive mathematics plus a non-trivial fragment of the axiom of choice.
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We note that the inconsistency of DG with much stronger fragments of Transfer
is proved in [5, Theorem 29]. In particular, Transfer for Π01-formulas is used in the
latter, which readily translates to the Turing jump functional ∃2 in the systems
from [2]. As it happens, we study ∃2 in the next section.
We do not know whether the classical contraposition of (3.1) also leads to in-
consistency, but we now show that it implies the fan theorem, as follows.
(∀T 1 ≤ 1)
[
(∀α ≤1 1)(∃m
0)(αm 6∈ T )→ (∃n0)(∀β ≤ 1)(βn 6∈ T )
]
(FAN)
The variable ‘T 1’ is reserved for trees, while ‘T ≤1 1’ means that T is a binary tree.
Principle 3.5 (PF-TP∀). For internal ϕ(x) with all free variables shown, we have
(∀stx)ϕ(x)→ (∀x)ϕ(x). (3.4)
To be absolutely clear, (standard) parameters are not allowed in ϕ(x) as in (3.4).
Theorem 3.6. The system DG+ QF-AC1,0 + PF-TP∀ proves FAN.
Proof. We first prove FANst. If (∀stf ≤1 1)(∃
stn0)(αn 6∈ T ), then we have (∀f ≤1
1)(∃stn0)(αn 6∈ T ) since all binary sequences are standard by item (b) of the non-
standard axioms. Applying Rω, we obtain (∃stk0)(∀f ≤1 1)(∃n
0 ≤ k)(αn 6∈ T ),
and FANst follows. The latter immediately implies that
(∀stT 1 ≤ 1, G2)
[
(∀stα ≤1 1)(∃m
0 ≤ G(α))(αm 6∈ T )→ (∃stn0)(∀β ≤ 1)(βn 6∈ T )
]
.
Now drop the ‘st’ predicates inside the square brackets and apply PF-TP∀. The
resulting formula then yields FAN, thanks to QF-AC1,0. 
Note that QF-AC1,0 is ‘innocent’ in that it is included in the base theory of
higher-order Reverse Mathematics (see [16]). Next, we show that PF-TP∀ leads to
the ‘full’ Heine-Borel compactness of the Cantor space (for uncountable covers), as
in:
(∀G2)(∃〈β0, . . . , βk〉)(∀α ≤ 1)(∃i ≤ k)(α ∈ [βiG(βi))]). (HBUC)
Intuitively, any functional G2 gives rise to the ‘canonical’ cover ∪f∈C [fG(f)] of the
Cantor space, and HBUC tells us that the latter always has a finite sub-cover.
Theorem 3.7. The system DG+ PF-TP∀ proves HBUC .
Proof. Since every binary sequence is standard in DG, we have (∀α ≤ 1)(∃stβ ≤
1)(α ≈1 β), i.e. the nonstandard compactness of the Cantor space. However, the
usual proof that the latter is equivalent to HBUC (see [3,23]) does not go through in
DG due to the weak conclusion of Rω. Instead, we prove (3.5), which immediately
yields HBUC via PF-TP∀.
(∀stG2)(∃〈β0, . . . , βk〉)(∀α ≤ 1)(∃i ≤ k)(α ∈ [βiG(βi))]) (3.5)
To prove (3.5), fix nonstandard N and define βi := σ ∗00 where σ is the i-th binary
sequence of length N . Then 〈β0, . . . , β2N 〉 is as required for (3.5), as every βi is
standard by item (b) in the nonstandard axioms, and hence G(βi) is standard.
Indeed, (∀α ≤1 1)(∃i ≤ 2
N)(βi ≈1 α), we are done. 
As to concluding remarks, Benno van den Berg has suggested ‘ϕ(x) ≡ (∃y)(x ≤∗
y)’ to show that PF-TP∀ does not lead to a conservative extension of DG.
Secondly, by [19, Cor. 6.7] and [20, Thm. 3.3], the Turing jump functional ∃2
from Section 3.1.2 and HBUC give rise to ATR0, and it is a natural question whether
the same holds for the system DG+ PF-TP∀ + QF-AC
2,1 + (∃2).
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Thirdly, the axiom HBUC is extremely hard to prove: by [20, §3.1], Π
1
k-CA
ω
0
does not prove HBUC (for all k), where the former is RCA
ω
0 plus the existence of
S2k, a functional which decides the truth of Σ
1
k-formulas (only involving type one
parameters). Hence, DG+ PF-TP∀ is a rather peculiar system.
Fourth, since DG proves that all binary sequences are standard, the following
fragment of Transfer, introduced in [19], follows trivially:
(∀stY 2)
[
(∃f1 ≤1 1)(Y (f) = 0)→ (∃
stf1 ≤1 1)(Y (f) = 0)
]
(WT)
Note that WT is quite strong: working in the systems from [2], WT gives rise
to a functional κ3 which computes a realiser for HBUC , but not vice versa (see
[19, Theorem 6.17]). In fact, the combination of κ3 and ∃2 (from the next section),
gives rise to full second-order arithmetic by [19, Rem. 6.13].
3.1.2. The Turing jump functional. We show that the Dinis-Gaspar system is in-
consistent with (∃2) relative to the standard world. The axiom (∃2) is given by:
(∃ϕ2)(∀f1)[(∃n0)(f(n) = 0)↔ ϕ(f) = 0]. (∃2)
Note that Π01-TRANS→ (∃
2)st by the proof of Corollary 3.9, where Π01-TRANS is:
(∀stf1)
[
(∀stn)(f(n) = 0)→ (∀n)(f(n) = 0)
]
, (3.6)
i.e. (∃2)st follows from a fragment of Transfer using Mω.
Theorem 3.8. The system DG+ (∃2)st is inconsistent.
Proof. Define the (standard) functional Z1→1 as Z(f)(n) = 0 if f(n) = 0, and 1
otherwise. Since Z(f) ≤∗1 1, the binary sequence Z(f) is standard for any input f ,
due to item (b) of the standardness axioms. Hence, (∃2)st immediately yields:
(∃stϕ20)(∀f
1)[(∃stn0)(f(n) = 0)↔ ϕ0(f) = 0], (3.7)
by taking ϕ0 := ϕ ◦ Z for ϕ as in (∃
2)st. Clearly, (3.7) implies
(∀f1)[ϕ0(f) = 0→ (∃
stn0)(f(n) = 0)],
and applying IPω
∀˜st
yields
(∀f1)(∃stm0)[ϕ0(f) = 0→ (∃n
0 ≤ m)(f(n) = 0)],
while applying Rω yields:
(∃stk0)(∀f1)(∃m0 ≤ k)[ϕ0(f) = 0→ (∃n
0 ≤ m)(f(n) = 0)]. (3.8)
Now let k0 be a standard number as in (3.8) and define f
1
0 as f0(i) = 1 for i ≤ k0+1,
and 0 otherwise. Clearly, ϕ0(f0) = 0 by (3.7), but this contradicts (3.8). 
The following corollary also follows from the proof of [5, Theorem 29].
Corollary 3.9. The system DG+Π01-TRANS is inconsistent.
Proof. Note that Y0 as in (3.3) is standard, while Π
0
1-TRANS guarantees that Y0
behaves just like ϕ in (∃2)st. Indeed, Mω implies MPst, i.e. Markov’s principle
relative to the standard world, and Π01-TRANS thus implies
(∀stf1)
[
(∃n)(f(n) = 0)→ (∃stn)(f(n) = 0)
]
,
which is trivially equivalent to (3.6) in classical logic. 
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Let TJ(f, ϕ) be the formula in square brackets in (∃2). By [3, Theorem 4.4], we
have Π01-TRANS ↔ [(∃
stϕ2)(∀stf1)TJ(f, ϕ) + (E2)
st] over a weak classical system.
Surprisingly, only the final conjunct gives rise to inconsistency, which is implicit in
the proof of Theorems 3.2 and 3.20.
Corollary 3.10. DG+ (∃stϕ2)(∀stf1)TJ(f, ϕ) is consistent if E-HAω + (∃2) is.
Proof. Using the same trick involving Z as in the theorem, (∃stϕ2)(∀stf1)TJ(f, ϕ)
is equivalent to (∃stϕ2)(∀f1)TJ(f, ϕ). The latter follows from (∃2) by taking such ϕ
and defining ϕ1(f) = 1 if ϕ(f) 6= 0, and 0 otherwise. Since ϕ1 ≤
∗
2 1, this functional
is standard by item (b) of the standardness axioms. As (∃2) is internal, the theorem
now follows from the soundness theorem as in [5, Theorem 16], since E-HAωst and
E-HAω prove the same internal formulas. 
Corollary 3.11. The system DG+ (E2)
st is inconsistent.
It should be noted that DG is even inconsistent with the rule version of the
axiom (E2)
st. Indeed, DG proves that Y0, f0, g0 from the proof of Theorem 3.2 are
standard and satisfy f0 ≈1 g0. However, a proof of Y0(f0) = Y0(g0), say obtained
by the aforementioned rule, then leads to a contradiction.
Corollary 3.12. The system DG+ QF-AC1,0 + (∃2) + PF-TP∃ is inconsistent.
Proof. Using QF-AC1,0, (∃2) readily implies
(∃ϕ2,Ψ2)(∀f1)
[
((∃n0)(f(n) = 0)→ ϕ(f) = 0) ∧ (ϕ(f) = 0→ f(Ψ(f)) = 0)
]
,
where Ψ(f) is the least such n if existent. By PF-TP∃, there is standard such Ψ
2,
upon which we obtain Π01-TRANS, a contradiction by Corollary 3.9. 
In conclusion, while DG is inconsistent with a number of fragments of Transfer,
the inconsistency is really due to the axiom of extensionality relative to the standard
world, and not e.g. the Turing jump functional as in Corollary 3.10. Since the axiom
of extensionality is not rejected in constructive (esp. intuitionistic) mathematics,
all we can say is that these results suggest that DG is non-classical.
Furthermore, DG proves ¬(∃2)st by Theorem 3.8, and classically ¬(∃2) is equiv-
alent to the continuity of all functionals on the Baire space ([16, Prop. 3.7]); a
similar equivalence involving SE holds constructively by [13, Thm. 26]. However,
these equivalences use Grilliot’s trick (see [16, p. 287]) and hence require the axiom
of extensionality (in some form or other). Thus, to derive (intuitionistic) continu-
ity theorems from ¬(∃2)st, one would need standard extensionality, which leads to
inconsistency by Corollary 3.11. Thus, DG is definitely non-classical, but not really
intuitionistic.
3.1.3. Arithmetical comprehension. We show that the Dinis-Gaspar system is in-
consistent with ACA0 relative to the standard world. The axiom ACA0 is:
(∀f ≤ 1)(∃g ≤ 1)(∀n0)[(∃m)(f(n,m) = 0)↔ g(n) = 0]. (ACA0)
Our formulation of arithmetical comprehension as in ACA0 makes use of functions,
while the version used in RM (see [25, II]) makes use of sets. These versions
are equivalent in light of [25, II.3]. We single out ACA0 lest anyone believe the
inconsistency in Theorem 3.8 is due to the presence of third-order objects.
Theorem 3.13. The system DG+ ACAst0 is inconsistent.
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Proof. Since all binary sequences are standard in DG, ACAst0 implies that for all
f ≤ 1, there is standard g ≤ 1 such that
(∀stn0)[(∃stm)(f(n,m) = 0)→ g(n) = 0] ∧ (∀stk)[g(k) = 0→ (∃stl)(f(k, l) = 0)].
The second conjunct yields (∃sth1)(∀stk)[g(k) = 0 → (∃l ≤ h(k))(f(k, l) = 0) due
to IPω
∀˜st
and mACω . Thus, (∀f ≤ 1)(∃sth)(∃stg ≤ 1)A(f, g, h), where A(f, g, h) is
(∀stn0)[(∃stm)(f(n,m) = 0)→ g(n) = 0]∧(∀stk)[g(k) = 0→ (∃l ≤ h(k))(f(k, l) = 0)].
Since realisation Rω also applies to external formulas, we obtain
(∃sth10)(∀f ≤ 1)(∃h ≤
∗
1 h0)(∃
stg ≤ 1)A(f, g, h) (3.9)
Now define f0(n,m) as 0 if m > h0(n), and 1 otherwise, where h0 is as in (3.9).
For this f0, (3.9) provides g0, which satisfies by definition:
(∀stn)
[
(∃stm)(f0(n,m) = 0)→ (g0(n) = 0)→ (∃m ≤ h0(n))(f0(n,m) = 0)
]
,
which contradicts the definition of f0, and we are done. 
It is tempting, but incorrect, to apply the reasoning from the previous proof to
(∀f ≤ 1)[(∃stn)(f(n) = 0)→ (∃stm)(f(m) = 0)]. (3.10)
Indeed, IPω
∀˜st
does not allow pulling the underlined quantifier in (3.10) to the front.
Finally, while DG proves the non-classical ¬(ACAst0 ), we show in Section 3.2.1
that it does prove the classical WKLst, i.e. the latter does not lead to inconsistency.
3.1.4. Non-classical continuity. We show that relative to the standard world, ex-
tensional functions on the Cantor space are automatically continuous on C. We
also show that they are nonstandard continuous as follows:
(∀stf ∈ C)(∀g ∈ C)(f ≈1 g → Y (f) = Y (g)). (3.11)
Using Mω and Rω, one readily shows that (3.11) implies ‘epsilon-delta’ continuity
relative to the standard world, and the latter implies (3.11) using item (b) of the
nonstandard axioms of DG. Note that uniform nonstandard continuity is (3.11)
with the leading ‘st’ dropped.
Theorem 3.14. The system DG proves that any Y 2 satisfying (E2)
st is also non-
standard (uniformly) continuous on the Cantor space.
Proof. Suppose Y 2 satisfies (E2)
st, which immediately yields:
(∀f, g ∈ C)(∃stN0)(fN = gN → Y (f) = Y (g)). (3.12)
using Mω and the fact that all binary sequences are standard in DG. Applying Rω
to (3.12) yields that Y 2 is nonstandard (uniformly) continuous. 
Note that, by the proof Theorem 3.2, there are plenty (standard) functionals Y 2
that are not standard extensional as in (E2)
st.
Theorem 3.14 can be interpreted as saying that DG has intuitionistic features
(in that ‘more’ functionals are continuous than in classical mathematics), but the
following corollary shows that something ‘much more non-classical’ is going on. A
functional Y 2 is near-standard if (∀stf1)(∃stn)(Y (f) = n), as defined in [21, p. 93].
Corollary 3.15. The system DG proves that for any near-standard Y 2 satisfying
(E2)
st, there is standard Z2 such that (∀f ∈ C)(Z(f) =0 Y (f)).
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Proof. First of all, since all binary sequences are standard, (∀f ∈ C)(∃stn)(Y (f) =
n) follows from the near-standardness of Y , and applying Rω yields a standard
upper bound n0 for Y
2 on the Cantor space. Fix nonstandard N0 and define Z(f)
as Y (fN0∗00 . . . ) if fN0 is a binary sequence, and n0 otherwise. Then Z(f) = Y (f)
for f ∈ C by standard extensionality, and Z ≤∗2 n0 implies that Z is standard. 
By the theorem, standard extensionality implies continuity relative to the stan-
dard world. Now, as discussed in [2, 22], one can naturally interpret the standard-
ness predicate ‘st(x)’ as ‘x is computationally relevant’ using the systems from
[2]. With this interpretation in mind, Corollary 3.15 expresses that relative to
‘st’, continuity implies being computable (in some sense). However, intuitionis-
tic mathematics, the continuity axiom WC-N in particular, refutes Church’s thesis
CT, where the latter expresses that all sequences are computable (in the sense of
Turing), and the former implies Brouwer’s continuity theorem (see [28, p. 211]).
We can even prove a stronger consequence of Theorem 3.14, as follows.
Corollary 3.16. The system DG+ (∃2) proves that for any near-standard Y 2 and
standard g1, there is standard Z2 such that (∀f ≤1 g)(Z(f) = Y (f)).
Proof. Use (∃2) to define Z(f) as Y (f) if f ≤1 g and 0 otherwise. Then Z is
standard in the same way as in the corollary: since g is standard, f ≤1 g is too. 
By the previous, any functional Y 2 is automatically standard if it is near-
standard on C, and zero elsewhere.
3.2. Non-intuitionistic aspects of the Dinis-Gaspar system. We show that
the Dinis-Gaspar system does not qualify as a system of intuitionistic mathematics
for the following reasons:
(i) The system DG proves, relative to the standard world, the weak Ko¨nig’s
lemma, which is rejected in constructive mathematics (Section 3.2.1).
(ii) The system DG is inconsistent with the axiom, relative to the standard
world, all functions are (epsilon-delta) continuous on the Baire space (Sec-
tion 3.2.2).
(iii) The system DG is inconsistent with the axiom schema, relative to the stan-
dard world, called Kripke’s scheme (Section 3.2.3).
Regarding the occurrence of ‘relative to the standard world’ in the previous items,
we recall the following regarding the standard objects in internal set theory.
For example, the set N of all natural numbers, the set R of all real
numbers, the real number pi, and the Hilbert space L2(R) are all
standard sets, since they may be uniquely described in conventional
mathematical terms. Every specific object of conventional mathe-
matics is a standard set. It remains unchanged in the new theory.
([18, p. 1166], emphasis in original)
We note that all closed terms of DG are standard, and presumably every object
which may be constructed (in some sense or other from constructive mathematics)
will be standard. Moreover, even in the classical system from [2], the standard ob-
jects yield (copious) computational/constructive content, as detailed in [22]. Thus,
the standard world should be the focus of our attention, if we are interested in
computational/constructive content.
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3.2.1. Weak Ko¨nig’s lemma. We show that the Dinis-Gaspar system proves, rela-
tive to the standard world, weak Ko¨nig’s lemma and the latter’s uniform version.
Recall that the variable ‘T ’ is reserved for trees, and we denote by ‘T ≤1 1’ that T
is a binary tree. Then WKL is just the classical contraposition of FAN, and
(∃Ψ)(∀T 1 ≤ 1)
[
(∀n0)(∃β ≤ 1)(βn ∈ T )→ (∀m0)(Ψ(T )m ∈ T )
]
(UWKL)
the uniform version. As WKL is (constructively) equivalent to a fragment of the
law of excluded middle (see [12]), it is rejected in constructive mathematics.
Theorem 3.17. The system DG proves WKLst and UWKLst.
Proof. Let f10 be the sequence that is constant 0. Let T be a standard binary tree
such that (∀stn0)(∃σ1 ≤ 1)(σn ∈ T ), i.e. T is infinite relative to the standard world.
We immediately obtain:
(∀stn0)(∃σ1 ≤ 1)(∀m ≤ n)(σm ∈ T ),
and applying Iω (since ‘≤∗0’ is ‘≤0’ by definition) yields (∃σ
1 ≤ 1)(∀stn)(σn ∈ T ).
Since σ ≤∗1 1, item (b) of the nonstandard axioms implies that σ is a standard
binary sequence, and WKLst follows. To obtain UWKLst, fix nonstandard N and
define Φ1→1 as follows: Φ(T ) is σ ∗ f0 where σ ∈ T is the left-most binary sequence
of maximal length |σ| ≤ N , if it exists, and f0 otherwise. Since Φ ≤
∗
1→1 1, this
defines a standard functional, and we are done. 
Kohlenbach shows in [15] that RCAω0 ⊢ UWKL ↔ (∃
2) crucially depends on the
axiom of extensionality. Assuming DG is consistent, we do not have access to (E2)
st
by the proof of Theorem 3.8, and hence (∃2)st does not follow from UWKLst in DG,
i.e. the previous theorem does not lead to a contradiction. Moreover, the first part
of the theorem, involving a classical system, has been proved in [4], and the proof
in the latter seems to go through in our (semi-)intuitionistic setting.
Moreover, WKL is (constructively) equivalent to (∀x ∈ R)(x ≥ 0∨ x ≤ 0) and to
the fact that every real in [0, 1] has a binary representation (see [12]). As expected,
DG also proves versions of the latter, relative to the standard world.
Theorem 3.18. The system DG proves that every real in the unit interval has a
standard binary approximation, i.e. (∀x ∈ [0, 1])(∃stf ∈ C)
(
x ≈
∑∞
n=0
f(n)
2n
)
, and
(∃stΦ2)(∀x ∈ R)(Φ(x) = 0→ x / 0 ∧ Φ(x) = 1→ x ' 0). (3.13)
Proof. Fix nonstandard N and define Φ2 as: Φ(x) = 0 if [x](N) ≤ 1
N
, and 1
otherwise. Note that Φ ≤∗2 1 implies this functional is standard. Then Φ(x0 − 1/2)
provides the first bit of a binary approximation of x0, and given the first n such
bits b0, . . . , bn−1, then Φ(x0 − (
1
2n+1 +
∑n−1
i=0
bi
2i+1 )) yields the n+ 1-th bit. 
There are a number of other theorems (constructively) equivalent to WKL by
[12], like e.g. the intermediate value theorem. As expected, one can also establish
these theorems relative to ‘st’ inside DG, but we do not go into details.
It is well-known thatWKL is inconsistent with the aforementioned axiom Church’s
thesis CT ([1, p. 68]). Since DG proves WKLst, one expects DG to be inconsistent
with CT relative to the standard world. Let ‘ϕe,s(n) = m’ be the (primitive recur-
sive) predicate expressing that the Turing machine with index e and input n halts
after at most s steps with output m. Then Church’s thesis is defined as follows.
(∀f1)(∃e0)(∀n0,m0)
[
(∃s0)(ϕe,s(n) = m)↔ f(n) = m
]
. (CT)
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Theorem 3.19. The system DG proves ¬CTst.
Proof. Suppose CTst holds. Fix nonstandardN0 and define (standard by definition)
f0 ≤ 1 as follows: f0(e) = 1 if (∃s ≤ N)(ϕe,s(e) = 0), and 0 otherwise. Then there
is standard e00 such that (∃
sts0)(ϕe0,s(e0) = m)↔ f0(e0) = m for any standard m.
However, f0(e0) = 1 implies by definition (∃s
0 ≤ N)(ϕe0,s(e0) = 0), a contradiction.
Similarly, f0(e0) = 0 implies by definition (∀s
0 ≤ N)(∀n0)(ϕe0,s(e0) = n→ n 6= 0),
a contradiction. Since we obtained a contradiction in each case, CTst is false. 
3.2.2. Intuitionistic continuity. We show that DG is inconsistent with certain ax-
ioms, relativised to the standard world, of intuitionistic mathematics.
First of all, we consider the continuity principle BCTC ≡ (∀Y
2)contC(Y ), which
expresses that all functionals are (epsilon-delta) continuous on the Cantor space,
as given by the following formula:
(∀f ≤ 1)(∃N0)(∀g ≤ 1)(fN = gN → Y (f) = Y (g)). (contC(Y ))
Secondly, we consider the principle weak continuity for numbers
(∀α1)(∃n0)A(α, n)→ (∀α1)(∃n0,m0)(∀β1)[αn = βm→ A(α,m)] (WC-N)
for any formula A in the language of finite types. Let WC-N0 be the restriction of
WC-N to quantifier-free formulas, and recall the axiom SE from Section 3.1.1.
Theorem 3.20. The systems DG+(BCTC)
st, DG+(WC-N0)
st, and DG+SEst are
inconsistent.
Proof. For the first part, consider Y0, f0, g0 as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 and note
that f0 ≈ g0 contradicts (BCTC)
st. For the second part, take A(α, n) ≡ (Y0 = n)
and note that (WC-N0)
st implies that Y0 is epsilon-delta continuous on C, relative
to the standard world. For the third part, note that SEst implies (E2)
st. 
Note that Y0 is not sequentially continuous relative to the standard world, i.e. the
restriction of BCTC to sequential continuity does not change the previous theorem.
Moreover, due to Mω, there is no difference between LPOst and the weakerWLPOst,
i.e. the associated notion of nondiscontinuity ([12, Thm. 3]) is not relevant here.
As an aside, SE follows from WMP by [13, Thm. 11], which in turns is provable
in (constructive) recursive mathematics (see [12, Prop. 13]). Hence, DG is also
inconsistent with theorems of recursive mathematics, relative to the standard world.
As another aside, we prove that DG is consistent (or even outright proves) certain
theorems of intuitionistic mathematics. Indeed, a consequence of BCTC (together
with FAN) is that all functions on C are bounded.
Theorem 3.21. The system DG proves (∀stY 2)(∃stN0)(∀stf ≤ 1)(Y (f) ≤ N); the
system DG+ PF-TP∀ proves (∀Y
2)(∃N0)(∀f ≤ 1)(Y (f) ≤ N).
Proof. For standard Y 2, since all binary sequences are standard, we have (∀f ≤
1)(∃stn0)(Y (f) ≤ n), and Rω finishes the first part. For the second part, drop all
but the leading ‘st’ and apply PF-TP∀. 
The previous implies that DG+PF-TP∀ is inconsistent with recursive mathemat-
ics, as the latter involves unbounded functionals on 2N (see [1, p. 70]). In particular,
DG + PF-TP∀ + CT is inconsistent, which also follows from Theorem 3.6 if we in
addition add QF-AC1,0 to the system.
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Finally, we show that the Dinis-Gaspar system is inconsistent with a classical
continuity principle. Our motivation is to exclude an incorrect interpretation of
the results in the previous two sections. Indeed, one could say that DG is slightly
classical (as it proves WKLst) and therefore Theorem 3.20. As it turns out, DG is
inconsistent with (BCTC)
st restricted to continuous functionals.
Thus, define CCTC ≡ (∀
stY 2)(contC(Y ) → [contC(Y )]
st), which expresses that
all functionals which are (epsilon-delta) continuous on C, are also continuous in this
way relative to the standard world. Note that CCTC readily follows from Transfer.
Theorem 3.22. The system DG+ CCTC is inconsistent.
Proof. Consider the standard objects Y0, f0, g0 as in the proof of Theorem 3.2 and
note that f0 ≈ g0 contradicts CCTC as contC(Y0). 
One could replace the antecedent of CCTC with more restrictive internal formu-
las, but the end result would still be the same.
3.2.3. Kripke’s scheme. We show thatDG is inconsistent with a fragment ofKripke’s
scheme relative to the standard world. This is not that surprising since DG includes
nonstandard Markov’s principle Mω, which implies MPst, i.e. Markov’s principle
MP relative to the standard world. Indeed, Markov’s principle MP is rejected in
intuitionistic mathematics, which was first established by Brouwer using an axiom
scheme nowadays called Kripke’s scheme (see [6, p. 244] for details). The ‘strong’
form of this scheme is formulated as follows by Dummett in [6].
Principle 3.23 (KS∗). For any formula A, we have
(∃˜β ≤ 1)(A↔ (∃n0)(β(n) = 1)).
We consider the following special case of KS∗:
(∀α ≤ 1)(∃β ≤ 1)(∀m0)
[
(∀k0)α(k,m) = 0↔ (∃n)(β(n,m) = 0)
]
. (KS∗0)
By [28, §9.5], Markov’s principle MP and the Kripke schema imply the law of
excluded middle, which is a similar result to what is obtained in the following
proof.
Theorem 3.24. The system DG+ (KS∗0)
st is inconsistent.
Proof. Fix nonstandardN0 and fix standard α, β ≤ 1 as in (KS∗0)
st; let g0(m) (resp.
h0(m)) be the least k ≤ N such that α(k,m) 6= 0 (resp. β(k,m) = 0) if it exists,
and N otherwise. Define (standard by definition) γ ≤1 1 such that γ(m) = 0 if
g0(m) > h0(m), and 1 otherwise. Then if we can prove the following:
(∀stm0)
[
(∀stk0)α(k,m) = 0↔ (∃stn)(β(n,m) = 0)↔ γ(m) = 0
]
, (3.14)
then we are done: Mω guarantees that (3.14) implies ACAst0 from Section 3.1.3, and
Theorem 3.13 yields the desired contradiction. To prove (3.14), if for standard m,
we have (∃stn)(β(n,m) = 0), then h0(m) is standard, while g0(m) is nonstandard
(by the first equivalence in (3.14)), i.e. h0(m) < g0(m). Note that (∀
stk0)α(k,m) =
0 implies (∀k0 ≤ K0)α(k,m) = 0 for some nonstandard K0 using Idealisation I
ω as
usual. The reverse implication follows in the same way using Mω. 
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3.3. Non-standard aspects of the Dinis-Gaspar system. We show that the
system DG includes a ‘standard part map’, a notion introduced in the next para-
graph. As we will see, this raises the question to what extent DG (and the system
from [9]) can still be referred to as ‘Nonstandard Analysis’ or ‘internal set theory’.
First of all, Robinson introduces the ‘standard part map’ ◦ in [21, p. 57]; the
latter maps any x ∈ [0, 1] to the (unique) standard ◦x such that x ≈ ◦x, and the
latter is called the ‘standard part’ of the former. However, in the Robinsonian
framework, the standard part map is external.
Secondly, in light of the previous, there is no hope of having access to this map
in Nelson’s IST: we are only given the Standardisation axiom in which the standard
part of a real exists. Nonetheless, we show that DG does afford a standard part
map, and even a generalisation to functionals on the Cantor space.
Theorem 3.25. There is a term u(1×0)→1 of Go¨del’s T such that DG proves: for
nonstandard N0 and x ∈ [0, 1], we have st1(u(x,N)) and u(x,N) ≈ x.
Proof. Let f10 be the constant zero function. Recall the functional Φ form Theorem
3.18 and fix nonstandard N ; define v(x,N) as Ψ(x,N) ∗ f0 if −
1
N
≤Q [x](2
N ) ≤Q
1+ 1
N
, and f0 otherwise. Here, Ψ(x, 0) is 〈Φ(x−
1
2 )〉 and Ψ(x, n+1) is Ψ(x, n)∗ 〈b〉,
where b = Φ(x−( 12n+1+
∑n−1
i=0
Φ(x,n)(i)
2i+1 )). Since v(x,N) ≤
∗
1 1, the former is standard
(in the sense that st1(v(x,N)) for any x ∈ [0, 1]), and satisfies
∑∞
n=0
v(x,N)(n)
2n+1 ≈ x
by design. Define standard w1→1 as w(α)(n) :=
∑n
i=0
α(n)
2n , and note that u := w◦v
is as required by the theorem. 
Recall that we (may) view any sequence as a real; since λx.v(x,N) ≤∗1→1 1 we
have st1→1(λx.v(x,N)), and the standard part map u := w ◦ v is thus standard in
DG, a fairly ‘non-standard’ situation as discussed in Remark 3.28.
Theorem 3.26. There is s(2×0)→2 in Go¨del’s T such that DG proves: for non-
standard N0 and near-standard Y 2 such that (E2)
st, we have st2(s(Y,N)) ∧ (∀f ∈
C)(s(Y,N)(f) = Y (f)).
Proof. By the near-standardness of Y 2, and the fact that all binary sequences
are standard, we have (∀f ∈ C)(∃stn)(Y (f) ≤ n), and Rω implies (∀f ∈ C)(∃n ≤
n0)(Y (f) ≤ n) for some standard n0. Fix nonstandardN0 and define s(Y,N0)(f) as
Y (fN0 ∗ 00 . . . ) if fN0 is a binary sequence, and n0 otherwise. Then s(Y,N0)(f) =
Y (f) for f ∈ C by standard extensionality, and λf.s(Y,N0)(f) ≤
∗
2 n0 implies that
st2(λf.s(Y,N0)(f)), as required. 
Corollary 3.27. The system DG + (∃2) proves that there is Φ2→2 such that for
near-standard Y 2, we have st2(Φ(Y )) ∧ (∀f ∈ C)(Φ(Y )(f) = Y (f)).
Proof. Use ∃2 to define Φ(Y )(f) as Y (f) if f ∈ C, and zero otherwise. Then Φ(Y )
is standard in the same way as in the theorem. 
The previous theorem could be obtained for F : [0, 1]→ R using Theorem 3.18,
but this development would mostly be repetitive. We finish this section with an
informal remark on just how unnatural the standard part maps of DG are.
Remark 3.28. The standard part maps of DG are quite unnatural from the point
of view of internal set theory for the following reason: the standard part of a real
x ∈ [0, 1] is unique in IST, i.e. if x ≈ y ≈ z and the latter two are standard reals,
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then y = z. Hence, if there were Φ : R → R such that Φ(x) ≈ x ∧ st(Φ(x)) for any
x ∈ [0, 1], then we observe that (∀x ∈ [0, 1])(st(x) ↔ x = Φ(x)). However, one of
the central tenets of IST is that ‘st’ is not definable via an internal formula:
To assert that x is a standard set has no meaning within conven-
tional mathematics-it is a new undefined notion. ([18, p. 1165])
These observations do not cause problems for DG of course: the uniqueness of
standard parts in IST requires Transfer anyway, while ‘x =R y ∧ st(x)’ does not
imply st(y) in DG due to issues of representation of reals. Nonetheless, DG is only
one basic step removed from being able to define ‘st1’ via an internal formula,
something which goes against the very nature of IST. Although the frameworks are
of course different, a similar case can be made for the Robinsonian approach.
Now, the law of excluded middle is referred to as a ‘taboo’ in constructive math-
ematics (see [1, I.3]). In light of the previous remark, those endorsing this kind
of language should probably use heresy when referring to the above standard part
maps of DG in the context of Nonstandard Analysis and internal set theory.
4. Conclusion
In the previous sections, we have provided fairly conclusive answers to questions
(Q1) and (Q2) from Section 1.1. We isolated (very) weak fragments of Transfer
which are still inconsistent with DG, and we identified a number of axioms of
intuitionistic (and general constructive) mathematics which are inconsistent with
DG when formulated relative to the standard world. We even established that DG
allows for a highly elementary standard part map, a rather ‘non-standard’ feature
of DG.
These facts all suggest -in one way or another- that DG is indeed non-classical,
but does not really deserve the description intuitionistic. At the same time, since
a standard part map is not available in Nelson’s internal set theory, and external
in Robinson’s approach, DG really pushes the boundary of what still counts as
‘Nonstandard Analysis’ and ‘internal set theory’.
In our opinion, the aforementioned problems trace back to one problematic ax-
iom of DG, namely item (b) of the nonstandard axioms. Simply put, this axiom
‘makes too many things standard’, an obvious example being the Cantor space.
While this axiom may be necessary and/or useful for the connection to the bounded
functional interpretation (see [5, §6] and [9, §4]), it is not natural from the point of
view of Nonstandard Analysis.
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